Progressivism’s iron law of oligarchy

A movement that cries “fight oligarchy” is, like all movements, run by the few for the few.

"Bernie Sanders & Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez" by Gage Skidmore is licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0.

The United States is currently plagued by a “fight oligarchy” speaking tour led by Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, two progressive socialists who seem oblivious to the lessons of the 20th century and incapable of condemning those who want to kill all the Jews.

However, despite the rather flawed characters leading this peculiar pageant, its title does raise an ironic and undoubtedly fascinating issue.

In the eyes of Sanders, AOC, and their supporters, the “oligarchy” that needs to be fought is a loosely defined group of far-right politicians. They very much include Donald Trump and are aided and abetted by widely demonized “tech bro” billionaires like Elon Musk and Peter Thiel.

Setting aside the question of whether this oligarchy truly exists or is merely a political alliance of convenience or ideology, such accusations inevitably raise the issue of logical and moral consistency. In other words, if progressives are to accuse others of oligarchy, what are their qualifications to do so?

Sanders, AOC, and their minions would no doubt claim that their credibility derives from holding the correct opinions. That is, they think oligarchy is bad and democracy is good. Thus, they are by definition tribunes of democracy. This is all that is required to obtain the right to condemn.

For those who may be skeptical of such assertions, this raises two questions: Is progressivism really democratic? Is progressivism an oligarchy?

The Iron Law

Many of us think the question answers itself: Progressivism is obviously an oligarchy.

The proof is simple mathematics. Progressivism embraces a wide range of policies and ideas, but few of them are particularly popular. While there are some exceptions, progressives are generally far from the American mainstream.

The last presidential election provides fairly conclusive evidence of this. It’s probable that if Kamala Harris had run as a radical rather than a moderate progressive, she would have garnered only about 30% of the vote. As many have pointed out, she suffered the most damage on progressive issues such as the trans movement.

Yet despite its disconnect from the American majority, progressivism wields immense political, intellectual, and cultural power. It exercises control over academia through a totalitarian dictatorship of the professoriate, largely dominates the entertainment and culture industries, and controls all media outlets except those that are explicitly conservative. Moreover, progressivism often succeeds in shaping the country’s public discourse to a surprising extent.

If progressivism were not an oligarchy, this would be impossible.

It should be noted that this is not the result of a conspiracy or the machinations of a secret cabal. It is a sociocultural arrangement that has been gradually built up over several decades. It is no more inherently sinister than the dominance of conservatives in the military or the financial sector. What it emphatically is not, however, is democratic.

Progressivism’s oligarchical model was inevitable for two reasons. First, a political movement that has completely alienated itself from the majority cannot influence society through democratic means.

Second, and more importantly, non-democratic rule is somewhat inevitable. Progressivism, despite its shrill protestations otherwise, is oligarchical because it is just like any other political movement.

This phenomenon was controversially explored by several early 20th-century intellectuals. It is summed up by the term “The Iron Law of Oligarchy.”

The term was indirectly coined by Robert Michels in his 1911 book, Political Parties. In it, Michels analyzed the internal structure of several European socialist parties. Despite being the most vocal advocates of democracy in Europe, Michels found that these parties were actually controlled by a small group of individuals who determined nearly all strategic and policy decisions. Thus, the most enthusiastic democrats in Europe were, somewhat unintentionally, oligarchs.

Michel concluded that this was not the result of a malicious conspiracy. It was simply inevitable. Once a party reaches a certain size, he believed, it needs greater and greater organization to maintain unity and effectiveness. This, in turn, necessitates increasing specialization, expertise, and professionalism. Only a select few party members with exceptional talent or skill are capable of fulfilling these demands. Consequently, they would inevitably come to control and rule the party itself, transforming it into an oligarchy.

In effect, Michels held that a terrible irony was at work: The democratic nature of these parties led to their large membership and thus to oligarchical leadership.

“Democracy leads to oligarchy, and necessarily contains an oligarchical nucleus,” he wrote. “The law that it is an essential characteristic of all human aggregates to constitute cliques and sub-classes is, like every other sociological law, beyond good and evil.”

This raised the inevitable “is/ought” problem. As Michel put it: “The oligarchical structure of the building suffocates the basic democratic principle. That which is oppresses that which ought to be.”

This phenomenon is very clearly at work among American progressives. Sanders and AOC represent small corners of New York City and Vermont. In other words, more or less nobody. Yet they wield not inconsiderable political and cultural power. The contradiction inherent in this seems never to occur to them.

The reason is the remarkable formulation mentioned above: Progressives believe they are democrats because they hold opinions. That is, they like democracy and therefore must be democratic. They ought to be democratic. Therefore, they are democratic. But that which is consistently and relentlessly oppresses them.

The noble lie of moral rule

Progressives generally assert that they have the right to rule because the people want them to. Of course, every movement in a democracy makes a similar claim. As Michels pointed out: “The political party is founded in most cases on the principle of the majority, and is founded always on the principle of the mass.”

This claim is particularly dubious in the case of progressives, considering their unpopularity. As a result, even without acknowledging it, they seek alternative means to legitimize their authority.

Their primary tactic is a moral one. Progressives claim that the majority is morally obligated to grant them power. They argue that the principles of progressivism and progressives are those of a caste of saints, and thus inherently compelling and compulsive.

These principles are a kind of weeping populism combined with violent anger. On the one hand, progressives claim to speak for the wretched of the earth: The poor, oppressed minorities, the disenfranchised, the dispossessed, the outcast, even the criminal and the terrorist. All of them, it is claimed, are human and therefore deserving of compassionate care.

On the other hand, progressivism’s sons of darkness, such as the Trumps and Musks of the world, brutally oppress and exploit the impoverished. Progressives routinely pledge to eliminate these “enemies of the people,” and at the extremes, to exterminate all the brutes. Progressives, in other words, are crusaders whom all are obligated to support in their righteous jihad.

There’s also the essential element of shame. Progressives rarely explicitly state it, but always strongly imply that, if you don’t support progressivism, you are complicit in the brutalization and, indeed, slaughter of the wretched of the earth. You are aiding and abetting the sons of darkness or, perhaps, one of them. In other words, you are a bad person. The only way to become good is to join the sons of light. In other words, vote for us and you’re absolved. This is a secular sale of indulgences, but a sale of indulgences nonetheless.

All of this is essentially a “noble lie,” a tale told to justify oligarchical power wielded in the name of democracy. Nonetheless, this lie is as crucial for progressives as Plato believed it would be for his ideal republic.

It is also fairly normal in modern politics. Michels wrote: “In the modern life of the classes and of the nations, moral considerations have become an accessory, a necessary fiction. Every government endeavors to support its power by a general ethical principle.”

Often, this involves the exploitation of people’s natural tendencies towards empathy and altruism: “The political forms in which the various social movements become crystallized also assume a philanthropic mask. There is not a single one among the young class-parties which fails, before starting on its march for the conquest of power, to declare solemnly to the world that its aim is to redeem, not so much itself as the whole of humanity, from the yoke of tyrannical minority, and to substitute for the old and inequitable regime a new reign of justice.”

“Political parties,” Michels states, “however much they may be founded upon narrow class interests and however evidently they may work against the interests of the majority, love to identify themselves with the universe.”

This may not be unusual, but taken to its logical extreme, it can become decidedly ominous. Michels illustrates this with a chilling quote from Alphonse Daudet: “The victims choose their words carefully; the executioners are drunk on tearful philosophy.”

Given radical progressives’ outspoken support for Hamas and numerous other terrorist groups and tyrannical regimes, it is hard not to see the drunk executioners at work on the edges—and moving towards the heart—of the movement.

Nonetheless, the noble lie remains formidable. Progressives themselves believe in it with perfect faith, and no one is more violent than when they are defending a god, especially a false one.

This is especially the case when the lie is a small minority’s strongest, and in some ways only, justification of its right to rule. In effect, it is the expression of the movement’s will to power. The noble lie is beyond good and evil.

Demography is destiny

Even if it were possible for a political movement to avoid oligarchy, it would be impossible for progressives to do so. The reason is simple numbers: There aren’t enough progressives to go around and, barring a seismic shift in American political and social mores, there likely never will be.

Part of the reason for this is, for lack of a better word, biological: Progressives don’t have a lot of children. Indeed, some of them deliberately have no children because of their environmentalist ideology.

There is nothing inherently wrong with not having children, but it does leave one at an electoral disadvantage. Despite illusions otherwise, politics are almost always familial. That is, most people vote the way their parents did. They form their worldview within the family environment and the surrounding community made up of those families. This is a major factor behind the existence of red and blue states that consistently and perpetually vote for one party or the other.

It is true that in almost every aspect of any society, numbers are not particularly relevant. A small minority can dominate an industry, a university, a media outlet, and so on.

In a nominal democracy, however, there is one area in which numbers definitely do matter: elections. As the saying goes: vox populi vox dei—“The voice of the people is the voice of God.” If you can’t muster up the votes, you are at a severe disadvantage.

Even if one works within the oligarchical leadership of a political party, one’s influence is limited because other factions within the oligarchy, who may be more popular with voters, will also have a say. Like it or not, progressivism lacks the votes to rule democratically.

Moreover, there is almost no way to reverse this. Progressives are overwhelmingly upper-middle-class and the upper-middle-class places so much emphasis on very expensive methods of child-rearing that a large family is simply not economically viable.

Moreover, the majority of people in a democracy are not and never will be upper-middle-class. A society cannot be so economically top-heavy without eventually collapsing. Consequently, the majority of people will always have economic interests and values that contradict those of the progressive class, and a significant portion of this majority is reproducing at a sustainable rate. As the population inevitably expands, progressive influence will naturally decline along with its percentage of the population.

In other words, in sheer biological terms, progressivism has no future.

Institutional reproduction

However, for a political movement, biology is not the only means of reproduction. It can also reproduce and even expand institutionally. That is, it can indoctrinate individuals who aspire to join the institutions that progressivism dominates. These institutions are numerous, thanks to the relative wealth and high levels of education among the upper-middle class.

All of these institutions are inherently ruled in an oligarchical and even absolutist manner. Consequently, oligarchy is fundamental to progressive rule.

The reason is that progressivism maintains its power and influence through entryism, a strategy that involves conquering and colonizing institutions from within. These institutions are then utilized for the purposes of mass conversion to the progressive creed. Oligarchy thus becomes the sole means by which progressivism can hope to produce the numbers necessary to dominate any democratic society.

This means of reproduction, however, is fraught with difficulties. Institutional bonds are far weaker than familial and communal bonds. Thus, considerable effort must be put into “keeping the troops in line.” Ideological blockade must be imposed to prevent contact with potentially seditious ideas. Ideological deviationism must be headed off and/or punished. Considerable efforts and funds must be expended on indoctrination. The institution itself must be kept powerful and influential, which involves a great deal of hustling and, again, money.

In many ways, however, the investment is worth it. Through its “institutional capture,” progressivism has managed to maintain its numbers, set the national discourse, control the “Overton Window,” and successfully impose wildly unpopular policies on a nation that does not want them.

The triumph of the professoriate

The immense advantages and disadvantages of this tactic are most strongly displayed by progressivism’s masterpiece: the modern university system. This is, in effect, the only institution over which progressivism exercises totalitarian control. Through the professoriate regime, a tiny oligarchy of fanatical and often violent radicals can completely control the manufacturing center of the American ruling class.

This epitomizes Michel’s observation that “the appearance of oligarchical phenomena in the very bosom of the revolutionary parties is a conclusive proof of the existence of immanent oligarchical tendencies in every kind of human organization which strives for the attainment of definite ends.”

Despite the professoriate regime’s blatantly oligarchical nature, progressivism has managed to establish and maintain it for decades. This is all the more striking given that the professoriate’s ideology is widely regarded as repulsive, if not morally reprehensible, by most Americans.

This remarkable feat has been achieved through the noble lie. By consistently proclaiming its radically democratic views, the professoriate has, until now, survived its own tyrannical tactics, anti-Americanism, antisemitism, racism, and idolatry of violent revolution. It must be admitted that this is a tremendous accomplishment and deserves a measure of dark admiration.

However, universities also demonstrate the weakness of progressivism. In particular, they are extremely costly to maintain, leading to an increasing reliance on taxpayer funds and exploitative financial practices.

In a nominal democracy, this is an unstable and dangerous situation because, sooner or later, people are going to wonder what they’re paying for. Today, upon examination, many of them have deemed the professoriate not only repulsive but also an active threat to the republic. Consequently, this bastion of progressive supremacy is threatened with, at the very least, significant financial hardship.

Progressives, naturally, are fighting back with everything they have and may ultimately win the fight. However, they now recognize that their institutional capture is not invulnerable and is, in fact, highly contingent. Until now, they have not required a democratic mandate, but they may very much need it in the future. They are paying the price for making such a mandate impossible.

Progressive nepotism

Another potentially fatal flaw in progressivism’s institutional capture is its blatant nepotism.

Nepotism itself is hardly unusual. Michel notes, “No one seriously engaged in historical studies can have failed to perceive that all classes which have ever attained to dominion have earnestly endeavored to transmit to their descendants such political power as they have been able to acquire.”

Still, though relatively normal, nepotism has serious detrimental effects, including incompetence and an ever-increasing “reality distortion field.” Moreover, for a movement that constantly claims to be radically democratic, such obvious oligarchical tendencies as nepotism create a situation of blatant hypocrisy that inherently undermines progressivism’s moral credibility.

For demographic and other reasons, progressive nepotism is rarely familial, though it can be that as well. It is a class nepotism and an institutional nepotism.

Regarding the former, it is fascinating that, despite its constant advocacy of “diversity,” progressivism has essentially no class diversity. Progressives, despite their diverse ethnic and racial identities, are almost universally drawn from the upper-middle class.

It’s remarkable how rarely institutional nepotism is mentioned, given that almost all progressive elites are graduates of a handful of Ivy League universities. Academia, the NGO industry, the cultural manufacturing centers, and so on have a plethora of Harvard graduates but few from any state or community college.

This ensures ideological homogeneity and purity, but it also creates a hermetic bubble that inevitably leads to oligarchy. This bubble also increasingly alienates progressives from their own society, resulting in a divorce from reality itself. As a result, progressivism’s political legitimacy and effectiveness are steadily eroded.

Patroni and clientes

Besides conquering and colonizing oligarchical institutions, progressives adopted a second model of rule: They formed an alliance between the upper-middle class and the underclass by declaring themselves tribunes of the poor.

They established a system that is essentially identical to the patronage system of ancient Rome. The ancient patronus was an exceptionally wealthy plutocrat who acted as a benevolent father figure to large groups of his impoverished fellow citizens. He provided them with financial assistance, political favors, and other benefits. In return, his clients were fiercely loyal to him. Patroni like Julius Caesar and others could utilize their clientes’ loyalty for political gain and, if necessary, as a mob weapon against their adversaries to enhance their political power.

Today, especially in urban areas, the progressive patronage system is exactly the same. It is based, to an extent, on the direct dispersal of welfare benefits, but not only that. It is often remarked, for example, that the politics of New York City and California are largely based on satisfying the demands of “the groups,” meaning activist representatives of various communities—often oligarchical themselves—in order to corral votes and thus maintain nearly perpetual political domination.

While there is nothing inherently wrong with trying to alleviate the suffering of others or to empower the underclass, it becomes a serious problem when it decays into a patronage system that wields disproportionate political power.

Such a system is inherently corrupting and often leads to stagnation and decline. Politicians are unable to even consider necessary reforms because such changes would outrage “the groups” they depend on.

As a result, infrastructure crumbles, tax bases disappear, and improvements become impossible except in moments of extreme distress (and often not even then). Society in general begins to fray. The consequences in cities like New York or Detroit are, to say the least, tragic to witness and ultimately benefit no one, not even the clientes themselves.

Patronage and diminishing returns

While the patronage system may be effective in the short term, it yields diminishing returns in the long run.

First, like institutional capture, it is wildly expensive, and these expenses are usually impossible to sustain. The reason is that clientes have powers of their own. Over time, they become as essential to the patroni as the patroni are to them. After all, without clientes, the patroni cannot rule.

As a result, the clientes begin to demand largesse not as a gift but as their right. Like a Ponzi scheme, more and more money must be poured into the patronage system until the demands outstrip the supply. At some point, the patronus has no more to give. At this point, anger, resentment, and sometimes violence ensue, making it increasingly difficult for the patroni to maintain their influence.

A second major flaw is a class one. That is, everyone involved in the patronage system knows deep down that there can be no true solidarity between the patronus and his clientes.

In the case of progressives, this contradiction is expressed in a kind of moral disconnect. That is, the ethos and moral imperatives of progressivism are vastly different from those of the poor, working, and lower-middle classes. Indeed, the lower classes, by and large, consider progressive values at best insane and at worst abhorrent.

Moreover, as an upper-middle-class movement, progressives have class interests that differ significantly from those of the lower classes, inevitably leading to conflict. In oligarchy lies alienation.

As Michels observed, “The leadership of the Socialist Party may fall into the hands of persons whose practical tendencies are in opposition with the program of the working class, so that the labor movement will be utilized for the service of interests diametrically opposed to those of the proletariat.”

In the American context, this can be observed in the fact that, despite their purported anti-capitalist stance, progressives have silently supported the principles of free trade. At the very least, they have done little to impede its progress. Today, this is no longer silent. Progressives openly and passionately oppose tariffs and other forms of protectionism that the working class sees as very much in its interests.

As a result, the unthinkable has occurred, and the working class has defected to the right. Thus, the all-unspoken class interests of upper-middle-class progressives have sliced off one of their most important clientes and seriously eroded progressive political power.

The cruel game

All of these flaws and contradictions may be inherent in oligarchies that rule in the name of democracy. At some point, everyone realizes that, as Michels puts it, “The words Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité may be read to this day over the portals of all French prisons.”

The result is often instability and decay, which can lead to serious social upheaval and the downfall of the existing oligarchy. This inevitably results in the rise of another oligarchy.

In this sense, progressivism is hardly unique. Michels asserts that all movements are subject to the same historical cycle:

The democratic currents of history resemble successive waves. They break ever on the same shoal. They are ever renewed. This enduring spectacle is simultaneously encouraging and depressing. When democracies have gained a certain stage of development, they undergo a gradual transformation, adopting the aristocratic spirit, and in many cases also the aristocratic forms, against which at the outset they struggled so fiercely.

“Now new accusers arise to denounce the traitors; after an era of glorious combats and of inglorious power, they end by fusing with the old dominant class; whereupon once more they are in their turn attacked by fresh opponents who appeal to the name of democracy,” Michel states.

Then he notes ominously, “It is probable that this cruel game will continue without end.”

It is not entirely certain that history is cyclical, but it is very likely. Messianic utopianism is popular in Abrahamic societies, but most other civilizations have never even entertained it. Moreover, a perfect society would inherently be a static society, and stasis rarely lends itself to longevity.

Nonetheless, messianic redemption is not an impossibility. We know too little about the world to say for sure. In this sense, progressivism or some other movement of political messianism may have the last laugh. At the moment, however, this seems unlikely.

Paradoxically, however, this gives progressives some reason for hope. If society is cyclical, then it is not only probable but inevitable that progressivism will rise again. In fact, the loss of its oligarchical power could be a boon to the movement. It will become purely oppositional, without responsibilities, but also free of obligations. It will become the “new accusers” who “arise to denounce the traitors” to democracy.

Indeed, the “fight oligarchy” tour, though absurd given progressivism’s current oligarchical nature, might be the initial step towards total opposition, paving the way to restoration.

If so, however, progressivism will face opposition at every turn. The conservative and MAGA movements are not going away, and the ideological and class contradictions inherent in progressivism are not either. These contradictions will continue to bedevil the movement, regardless of its growing power and popularity, making it difficult to fully jettison its oligarchical nature.

This is not a unique sin. If Michels is correct, no movement can ever jettison oligarchy. The “cruel game” is inherent in the beast.

However, Michels proposes that the ideal of democracy itself can contain oligarchy. That is, true democracy may be unattainable, but the idea of it can be used to gauge the extent to which an oligarchy serves the good. This, in itself, can mitigate its excesses.

As Michels puts it, “The democratic principle carries with it, if not a cure, at least a palliative, for the disease of oligarchy.”

At the moment, I do not believe that progressivism serves the good. It is perhaps the least democratic of America’s competing oligarchies and, as a result, one of its most corrupt and malignant. Nonetheless, it could redeem itself if it subjects itself to the judgment of the democratic ideal, in all its impossibility. This could be a palliative, not only for progressivism’s excesses, but also for its current predicament.

Perhaps we should hope that this occurs. If it does, the “cruel game” will have become a bit less cruel.