The virtue of ‘identity politics’
Radical identity movements are much more than a grievance industry.
In recent years, the question of identity has bedeviled Western politics. With the death of the great ideologies of the 20th century, it often appears that there has been a “balkanization” of the West. Myriad racial, ethnic, religious, sexual, and other groups have come to see themselves as distinct communities with specific interests different from and often in opposition to those of “mainstream” society.
Quite often, these groups, in their quest for rights they believe are denied them, take on every aspect of a mass movement. They have flags, slogans, advocacy organizations, something like provisional governments, distinctive slang and jargon that sometimes approximate a separate language, designated supporters and oppressors, and all manner of other distinctive qualities that are firmly asserted in the public sphere in order to emphasize difference and grievance. Especially but by no means only in the United States, these groups have proliferated to such an extent that, in many ways, “mainstream” society no longer exists.
It is widely believed by both liberals and conservatives that this “identity politics” is almost exclusively confined to the left. Examples include the trans movement, Black Lives Matter, #MeToo, the use of terms like “Latinx,” post-colonialism, critical race theory, and so on.
The right, however, has long since developed its own identity politics. There are marginal though worrisome groups like white supremacists and neo-Nazis, but also more mainstream Evangelical Christians, neoreactionaries, the paleoconservative “new right,” national conservatives, and others.
These mainstream groups consume the same media, hold similar political beliefs, have a shared vision of the ideal nation they wish to restore, and adhere to the same general principles on what constitutes social and cultural norms. They have also increasingly developed their own politics of grievance in which they view themselves as an oppressed class persecuted by elites who have illegitimately seized control of their nation, a sentiment that drove the right’s widespread acceptance of the lie that the 2020 election was stolen.
The most potent expression of this movement is unquestionably the cult of personality that surrounds Donald Trump. The Trumpists have dedicated themselves wholly to a specific leader and formed something like an ideology out of him, though he himself has essentially no ideology and has proved remarkably inept at actual leadership. This has become a savage discourse between the leader and his acolytes, and one often senses that Trump is as driven by his followers as they are driven by him. For a great many people, supporting and often worshiping Trump is a fundamental aspect of their identity.
There is no consensus term for all of these movements. The left-wing version is often described as “identity politics,” the “grievance industry,” or “woke.” Its right-wing version is usually simply called “MAGA” or “MAGA Republicans,” while the more rarified adherents have adopted terms like “national conservatism.”
This lack of a coherent vocabulary makes the nature of these groups difficult to analyze and, if necessary, counter. Nonetheless, they do seem to share certain characteristics and, in many ways, constitute a single phenomenon.
It is important to remember that this phenomenon is not new. The great 20th century ideologies these groups replaced were very similar. Nationalism, fascism, communism, and others shared many of the new movements’ characteristics, though on a far grander and more totalitarian scale.
Thus, it is not surprising that perhaps the best analysis of the phenomenon was written in 1945. In his essay “Notes on Nationalism,” George Orwell sought to understand the great movements of his time while at the same time struggling with the immense difficulty of actually defining them.
Indeed, Orwell admitted at the outset that he used the term “nationalism” for lack of a better term.
“There is a habit of mind which is now so widespread that it affects our thinking on nearly every subject, but which has not yet been given a name,” he wrote. “As the nearest existing equivalent I have chosen the word ‘nationalism.’”
Orwell stated that he did not use the term in its “ordinary” sense, because what he described as an “emotion” is often not concentrated on a “nation” in the formal sense.
“It can attach itself to a church or a class, or it may work in a merely negative sense, against something or other and without the need for any positive object of loyalty,” he wrote. He included in his definition “Communism, political Catholicism, Zionism, Antisemitism, Trotskyism and Pacifism” while admitting there might be many more.
“I mean the habit of identifying oneself with a single nation or other unit, placing it beyond good and evil, and recognizing no other duty than that of advancing its interests,” he stated.
Ultimately, Orwell concluded that there were three essential aspects to the phenomenon he imperfectly termed “nationalism.”
The first was Obsession: “As nearly as possible, no nationalist ever thinks, talks, or writes about anything except the superiority of his own power unit.”
The second was Instability: “The intensity with which they are held does not prevent nationalist loyalties from being transferable. To begin with, as I have pointed out already, they can be and often are fastened upon some foreign country.”
The third was Indifference to Reality: “All nationalists have the power of not seeing resemblances between similar sets of facts. A British Tory will defend self-determination in Europe and oppose it in India with no feeling of inconsistency. Actions are held to be good or bad, not on their own merits, but according to who does them, and there is almost no kind of outrage—torture, the use of hostages, forced labour, mass deportations, imprisonment without trial, forgery, assassination, the bombing of civilians—which does not change its moral colour when it is committed by ‘our’ side.”
Examining the various movements that typify today’s politics, especially in the United States, it seems that Orwell was largely correct.
Obsession, for example, is an obvious characteristic of all these movements. For MAGA, everything is Trump. For anti-racists, as was reportedly said by a staffer at the New York Times, “everything is race.” For the racist, everything is race as well, albeit turned on its head. For the LBGT movement, everything is sexuality or gender. For #MeToo, everything is women’s sexual integrity and safety. For Evangelical Christians, everything is Christ and his teachings. The same could be said of almost all similar movements in regard to their specific beliefs.
Instability is perhaps a rarer phenomenon, but it nonetheless clearly exists. The Israeli politician Avraham Burg, for example, was a staunch left-wing Zionist until he decided in the early 2000s that he was just as strident an anti-Zionist. Israeli Jews like Gideon Levy and Amira Hass are more fanatical Palestinian nationalists than most Palestinian nationalists. Some of Islamic fundamentalism’s most fervent opponents are former Islamic fundamentalists. The Never Trumpers were dedicated conservative Republicans until Trump arrived and they became, in essence, conservative Democrats who passionately support Joe Biden. The far-right has essentially adopted Hungary as a second home, seeing it as a model for America’s future, with a few adherents actually moving there. The examples are so legion that they are impossible to enumerate in full.
Indifference to reality is as ubiquitous as obsession. Trans activists simply refuse to see that, while many people support their right to live as they want, there can be legitimate concerns about giving children and adolescents powerful drugs and invasive elective surgery. MAGA adherents are willfully blind to Trump’s obvious corruption, sociopathy, and general indifference to democratic norms. The Israeli left still refuses to grapple with the implications of the consistent Palestinian refusal of peace. Evangelical Christians and their “new right” supporters are often totally indifferent to the words “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” Supporters of Palestinian nationalism tend not to acknowledge that “from the river to the sea” is a clear call for genocide and while they denounce violence when employed by Israel, they are more or less fine with the worst atrocities committed by Palestinians.
It seems, then, that Orwell was correct in his basic analysis of this distinct “emotion.” But can there be a better and more accurate name for it than “nationalism” and can it lead us to a somewhat more comprehensive understanding of it?
It seems to me that Orwell does not elaborate sufficiently on what may be the most important aspect of these movements, which is that they are all movements of radical identification. That is to say, they are not only movements of total adherence. They are also movements of the self. This means that while the movements themselves may be collective, they are also profoundly individual. Everyone, at one point or another, makes a conscious choice to join them or, if they were more or less born into them, to stay.
Thus, it would seem that the most accurate term we have to describe the phenomenon is “identity politics.” But this too is insufficient. These movements go well beyond politics. They can define everything from the language we speak to the clothes we wear, the food we eat, and who we have sex with. They are not mere ideologies, they provide us with ways of life. They are radical identity movements.
It is important to note that, for Orwell, such movements were wholly negative in nature. He saw what he called “nationalism” as “the habit of assuming that human beings can be classified like insects and that whole blocks of millions or tens of millions of people can be confidently labeled ‘good’ or ‘bad.’”
He added, “Nationalism is power hunger tempered by self-deception. Every nationalist is capable of the most flagrant dishonesty, but he is also—since he is conscious of serving something bigger than himself—unshakably certain of being in the right.”
Orwell, in other words, saw “nationalism” as a force for inhumanity, violence, hatred, and irrationality, though he did admit that “the nationalistic loves and hatreds that I have spoken of” are “part of the make-up of most of us, whether we like it or not. Whether it is possible to get rid of them I do not know, but I do believe that it is possible to struggle against them, and that this is essentially a moral effort.”
Thus, Orwell saw “nationalism” as a kind of neurosis that was fundamentally immoral, though there is always the possibility of overcoming or at least ameliorating it to some extent.
Today, there are many who take the same view. One often hears, usually from conservatives like Jordan Peterson, ferocious denunciations of “identity politics” or “wokeness,” which they see as a fundamental threat to liberal democracy and the social fabric in general.
It is obvious that there is something in this. Radical identification with a specific group or movement can certainly lead to prejudice, hate, and violence. In Orwell’s time, communism, fascism, and Nazism were the most blatant examples. In our time, the consequences are far less horrendous, but radical identity movements both left and right have certainly been involved in terrorism, riots, censorship, corruption, and other malfeasances.
Nonetheless, Orwell’s view strikes me as incomplete. There is no doubt that radical identification is something with which we are obliged to struggle (as a Zionist, I certainly do not except myself) but this does not necessarily mean that we should not radically identify. There are positive aspects to radical identification that I believe Orwell either elides or ignores.
For example, there is nothing wrong with self-definition. In an increasingly atomized world, people often struggle with the essential questions “Who are we? Where do we come from? Where are we going?” To find the answers to these questions is a real emotional, psychological, and even physical need. It cannot be fulfilled by a deracinated identity dedicated solely to the pursuit of material pleasures or personal advancement. Such things are perfectly satisfying to some, but not to others. We were not all born to toil in cubicles.
Moreover, while there are clearly negative aspects to radical identification, there are also negative aspects to not doing so. Without a sense of who we are, where we come from, and where we’re going, many of us find ourselves isolated and unhappy, unable to achieve fulfillment on the terms of a society in which mediums of exchange are often the only human connection. This has extremely negative consequences on the personal level, but it can do so on the social level as well. For example, in acts of sudden and extreme violence committed in order to gain attention and fame.
There are also many people for whom there is no choice except radical identification. LGBT people cannot be true to themselves without defying millennia-old social norms and prejudices, and this can only be effectively done via solidarity with other LGBT people. Black Americans are collectively subject to American racism, and thus identify with each other because they have no choice. As a tiny minority, Jews cannot possibly hope to pass on who they are to their children—and thus ensure their collective survival—without a strong identification with their people, of which one of the most prominent modern expressions is Zionism. The MAGA movement, though for the most part deplorable, does express some genuine resentments and justified economic discontents. Muslims are bound together by a 1,500-year-old religion and civilization of which they are justly proud.
To simply ignore these facts in favor of an amorphous alternative gets us nowhere, and in the end only enhances the discontent felt by the individuals who are members of these groups. Certainly, Orwell’s struggle is necessary for all of us, but it should not rob us of what can be gained through passionate identification with those with whom we feel a primal kinship.
There are certainly some forms of radical identification that are by definition bad and even evil. Communism and Nazism brought nothing good into the world. Supremacism of any kind can only lead to destruction of both others and oneself. Hating everyone who is not like you is pathological and ultimately condemns one to the same unhappiness one sought to escape. This cannot be denied.
Nonetheless, one must recognize that radical identification unleashes energies that can liberate and rejuvenate. They can enable one to make the fullest use of one’s talents and virtues. In many cases, they have brought renaissance to societies that were far gone into decadence and decay. Radical identification need not be mere balkanization and grievance. It can also be a rebirth.